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compose a sort of coda to the traumatic opera of the American Civil War of 1861–65. Reconstruction
embraces the twelve years of active effort to rebuild the American Union, though in some sense (because
Reconstruction had no official starting or ending date) aspects of it spluttered on well into the 1890s. I use the
word spluttered deliberately, because Reconstruction is also the ugly duckling of American history in the eyes
of many American historians, and something the public considers vaguely awful if it thinks of it at all. Absent
from Reconstruction are the conflict and the personalities that make the Civil War so colorful; it also lacks the
climactic battles and dissipates into a confusing and wearisome tale of lost opportunities, squalid victories,
and embarrassing defeats. It was, proclaimed one veteran of the Army of Northern Virginia, “not peace
established in power, but captured in shame; not throned on high by willing witnesses, but pinned to the earth
by imperial steel—the peace of the bayonet.” In many cases, especially for those who regard Reconstruction as
an unrelieved misery, almost the worst thing that can be said about someone is that they were prominent in
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Reconstruction as  
a Pure Bourgeois Revolution
ALLEN C. GUELZO
The years between 1865 and 1877, which form the period in Ameri-
can history known as Reconstruction, compose a sort of coda to the 
traumatic opera of the American Civil War of 1861–65. Reconstruction 
embraces the twelve years of active effort to rebuild the American 
Union, though in some sense (because Reconstruction had no official 
starting or ending date) aspects of it spluttered on well into the 1890s. 
I use the word spluttered deliberately, because Reconstruction is also 
the ugly duckling of American history in the eyes of many American 
historians, and something the public considers vaguely awful if it 
thinks of it at all. Absent from Reconstruction are the conflict and 
the personalities that make the Civil War so colorful; it also lacks the 
climactic battles and dissipates into a confusing and wearisome tale of 
lost opportunities, squalid victories, and embarrassing defeats. It was, 
proclaimed one veteran of the Army of Northern Virginia, “not peace 
established in power, but captured in shame; not throned on high by 
willing witnesses, but pinned to the earth by imperial steel—the peace 
of the bayonet.”1 In many cases, especially for those who regard Recon-
struction as an unrelieved misery, almost the worst thing that can be 
said about someone is that they were prominent in Reconstruction.
 One reason why Reconstruction has proven difficult to evaluate is 
that no convenient measuring stick for the success or failure of postwar 
reconstructions existed then or now. It may be helpful, as a cure for 
that vagueness, to describe three general standards conventionally 
used to describe and evaluate Reconstruction. One such device is what 
we may call Lincolnian Reconstruction. Abraham Lincoln was never at 
ease in using the word reconstruction—he qualified it with add- ons 
like “what is called reconstruction” or “a plan of reconstruction (as 
the phrase goes)”—and preferred to speak of the “re- inauguration 
 1. “Address of Private Leigh Robinson” (November 1, 1877), in Army of Northern 
Virginia Memorial Volume, edited by J. W. Jones (Richmond: J. W. Randolph and English, 
1880), 180, 188.
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of the national authority” or the need to “re- inaugurate loyal state 
governments.”2 The moment the war ended and his “war powers” 
expired, Lincoln’s logic dictated that the rebel states should simply 
resume their old place and old functions in the Union without let or 
hindrance, only requiring the abandonment of slavery.
 And if that really was the only goal of Reconstruction, then we 
should have to say that even in Lincoln’s absence, it was a clear- cut 
success. The secessionist regimes in the Southern states were finally 
deposed, new federally supervised Unionist regimes were put in their 
place, and one- by- one the rebel states were restored to the Union—
which is to say, they sent representatives and senators to Congress, 
and acknowledged federal laws passed by Congress and the federal 
military and civilian institutions that implemented them. Take it a 
point further: if the Civil War’s purpose was to reestablish a federal 
Union—a genuinely federal Union in which neither the states nor the 
federal government claimed exclusive sovereignty but shared it in a 
federal system—then Reconstruction should be as much a source of 
national self- admiration as the Civil War long has been. In fact, the 
next half- century proved to be something of a golden age of constitu-
tional state rights, with states taking up the political initiative in terms 
of civic reform, women’s rights, and public education long before the 
federal government ever noticed them.3
 But that, of course, is not the way Reconstruction has been taught 
to most of us—that is, when it has been taught at all. For decades, 
both the hell- no partisans of the Lost Cause and turn- of- the- century 
Southern Progressives maintained that Reconstruction, once Lincoln 
was removed, became a nightmare inflicted on them by a psychoti-
cally vengeful coterie of Radical Republican demagogues in Congress 
led by Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sumner, and Ben Wade. This we 
may call Radical Reconstruction, and it depicts the era as a kind of 
Vichy occupation, partly a draconian direct rule by scheming and 
unscrupulous conquerors, and partly an unstable domination by 
Southern turncoats.4 At best it was (in the highly influential work of 
 2. “Last Public Address,” April 11, 1865, Roy P. Basler et al., eds., The Collected Works 
of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 8:400, 
405.
 3. Louis P. Masur, Lincoln’s Last Speech: Wartime Reconstruction and the Crisis of Reunion 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 7, 69–70; Mark Wahlgren Summers, The 
Ordeal of the Reunion: A New History of Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2014), 4, 396–97.
 4. Hans L. Trefousse, The Radical Republicans: Lincoln’s Vanguard for Racial Justice 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), 21.
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the then- reigning prince of Reconstruction historians, William A. Dun-
ning, and his Columbia University graduate students J. G. Hamilton, 
Walter L. Fleming, and Francis Simkins) a gigantic example of radical 
hubris. At its worst it was described by Woodrow Wilson, who had 
grown up in the South during Reconstruction, as a carnival of racial 
misrule:
The first practical result of reconstruction under the acts of 1867 
was the disfranchisement, for several weary years, of the better 
whites, and the consequent giving over of the southern govern-
ments into the hands of the negroes. . . . They were but children 
still; and unscrupulous men, carpetbaggers, men not come to be 
citizens, but come upon an expedition of profit . . . came out of 
the North to use the negroes as tools for their own selfish ends; 
and succeeded, to the utmost fulfillment of their dreams. Negro 
majorities for a little while filled the southern legislatures; . . . 
the states were misgoverned and looted in their name; and a few 
men, not of their number, not really of their interest, went away 
with the gains. They were left to carry the discredit and reap 
the consequences of ruin, when at last the whites who were real 
citizens got control again.5
 Judged by the Dunning standard, Reconstruction was temporarily 
successful but for all the wrong reasons; and when it was overthrown 
in 1877, it was to be judged a failure we could all remember as a road 
never again to be taken in American life.
 Criticism of the Dunning school—and with it, the dominance of 
Southern voices in the interpretation of Reconstruction—offered its 
first major challenge in the 1930s, beginning with the attacks launched 
at the Dunningites by William Edward Burghardt Du Bois in Black 
Reconstruction (1935) and James S. Allen (the nom de plume of Sol 
Auerbach) in Reconstruction: The Battle for Democracy (1937). This, in 
a broad sense, we may call Revisionist Reconstruction. The Dunning 
school, Du Bois protested, had succeeded in making every “child in the 
street” believe that “the history of the United States from 1866 to 1876 
is something of which the nation ought to be ashamed.” Reconstruc-
tion might not have been a proud achievement but, Du Bois objected, 
 5. William A. Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics 
(New York: Macmillan, 1910), 384–85; Bernard A. Weisberger, “The Dark and Bloody 
Ground of Reconstruction Historiography,” Journal of Southern History 25 (November 
1959), 428, 446; Woodrow Wilson, “The Reconstruction of the Southern States,” Atlantic 
Monthly 87 (January 1901), 11.
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Reconstruction actually set an example “to democratic government 
and the labor movement today.” Allen agreed: “The destruction of 
the slave power was the basis for real national unity and the further 
development of capitalism, which would produce conditions most 
favorable for the growth of the labor movement.” The Dunningites 
thought that Radical Reconstruction was something to be deplored, 
and cheered when it failed; the revisionists agreed that it failed, but 
wept. Southern blacks (in Du Bois’s phrase) “went free; stood a brief 
moment in the sun; then moved back into slavery.”6
 Unhappily, neither Du Bois nor Allen possessed a broad platform 
on which to rally a countermovement; and they certainly had no aca-
demic platform in the universities. It would not be until the 1960s, after 
the emergence of the civil rights movement as a “second Reconstruc-
tion,” that the idols of the Dunning school really began to fall. John 
Hope Franklin’s Reconstruction after the Civil War (1961) and Kenneth 
Stampp’s The Era of Reconstruction, 1865–77 (1965) started the tipping 
over, to be followed by John and LaWanda Cox, Richard Current, Allen 
W. Trelease, and finally Eric Foner, with his massive Reconstruction: 
America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877 (1988).7
* * *
Noble as their intentions were, the revisionists had their foibles, too. 
Both Du Bois and Allen were writing from self- consciously Marxist 
frameworks that forbade any other understanding of Reconstruction 
but through class and revolution, with race sometimes deployed as 
a surrogate for class. Reconstruction thus became the moment when 
working- class black and white citizens together had an opportunity 
to create a new economic and political order in the South, only to 
have it yanked away by a nervous white Northern bourgeoisie who 
preferred making peace with the defeated Confederates to licensing 
a genuinely radical, biracial workers’ movement.
 6. W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, edited by David Levering Lewis 
(1935; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 717; James S. Allen, Reconstruction: The 
Battle for Democracy, 1865–1876 (New York, 1937), 28.
 7. Howard K. Beale, “On Rewriting Reconstruction History,” American Histori-
cal Review 45 (July 1940), 824; Richard O. Curry, “The Civil War and Reconstruction, 
1861–1877: A Critical Overview of Recent Trends and Interpretations,” Civil War His-
tory 20 (September 1974), 215–38; Michael Perman, “Accepting Defeat: Historians and 
Reconstruction,” and Herman Belz, “The New Orthodoxy in Reconstruction Histori-
ography,” in Reviews in American History 1 (March 1973), 106–13, and 14 (March 1986), 
83–90, respectively.
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 It was, in other words, a bourgeois- democratic revolution, not 
unlike the uprisings of 1789 and 1848 in that it pitted a capitalist 
middle- class bourgeoisie against a slaveholding aristocracy, striking 
up alliances with peasants on the land and workers in the tenements 
to overthrow the rule of the planter elite. Alas, bourgeois revolu-
tions frighten their own architects, who are themselves the owners 
of property—in this case, industrial property—and who quickly come 
to see that in empowering peasants and workers, they have created 
a Frankenstein monster that has no more respect for the bourgeoisie 
than it had for the aristocrats.8 At that moment of self- realization, the 
bourgeoisie strain to stuff the revolutionary genie they have sum-
moned—the peasants and urban proletariat—back into the lamp from 
which they had conjured it. “The bourgeoisie,” wrote Vladimir Lenin, 
“strives to put an end to the bourgeois revolution halfway from its 
destination, when freedom has been only half won, by a deal with the 
old authorities and the landlords.” They strive “to reach a tacit pact 
with the old landed aristocracy in order to preserve their power.”9 
But the genie cannot be stuffed back; it is only stunned, and in time 
it will reawaken with renewed strength as the guide and leader of the 
socialist revolution and finish off industrial capitalism the way the 
bourgeoisie finished off the aristocrats. Du Bois in particular bears the 
impress of this notion of Reconstruction as a “bourgeois revolution,” 
 8. On the general concept of bourgeois revolutions, see Colin Jones, “Bourgeois 
Revolution Revivified: 1789 and Social Change,” in Colin Lucas, ed., Rewriting the French 
Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 69–118; David Lockwood, “War, the State, 
and the Bourgeois Revolution,” War and Society 25 (October 2006), 53–78; and Shirley 
Gruner, “The Revolution of July 1830 and the Expression ‘Bourgeoisie,’” Historical Jour-
nal 11 (1968), 462–71. For arguments over which specific events can qualify as bourgeois 
revolutions, see Lawrence Stone, “The Bourgeois Revolution of Seventeenth- Century 
England Revisited,” Past and Present 109 (November 1985), 44–46 (on why the English 
Civil Wars do not); Stephen C. Topik, “Brazil’s Bourgeois Revolution?” Americas 48 
(October 1991), 270 (on why the overthrow of the Brazilian monarchy in 1889 does not); 
Jesús Cruz, “Notability and Revolution: Social Origins of the Political Elite in Liberal 
Spain, 1800 to 1853,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 36 (January 1994), 99 (on 
why nineteenth- century Spain’s liberals did not constitute a bourgeois revolution); and 
Tom Lewis, “Structures and Agents: The Concept of ‘Bourgeois Revolution’ in Spain,” 
Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies 3 (1999), 10 (on why nineteenth- century 
Spain’s liberals did constitute a bourgeois revolution).
 9. “Eric Foner’s ‘Reconstruction’ at Twenty- Five,” Journal of the Gilded Age and Pro-
gressive Era 14 (January 2015), 21; Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 
1967), 112, 143; Vladimir Lenin, “The Agrarian Question and the Forces of the Revolu-
tion” (1907), in Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 12:335; Jesús Cruz, 
“An Ambivalent Revolution: The Public and the Private in the Construction of Liberal 
Spain,” Journal of Social History 30 (Autumn 1996), 6.
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for in Du Bois’s telling, Reconstruction’s “vision of democracy across 
racial lines” was undone by a “counterrevolution of property.”10
 Critics of Marxist historiography have frequently rushed into the 
breaches opened by the English Civil Wars, the French Revolution, and 
of course the American Civil War with wholesale denials that these 
events were in any sense revolutionary, and indeed, many Marxist 
historians over time have glumly yielded to these protestations. And 
the American Civil War certainly offers good reasons for hesitating 
to cover the war and Reconstruction with a revolutionary draping. 
The first is that the Civil War was not revolutionary if discontinuity 
must be the fundamental evidence of revolution. Discontinuity was 
exactly what the Civil War had been waged to prevent. Moreover, the 
American bourgeoisie—which includes Lincoln, the Radical Republi-
cans, and the rank and file of the Northern soldiery—did not actually 
represent much of what could be safely called industrial capitalism. 
The contest waged between 1861 and 1865 was between two versions 
of agrarianism, between the free- labor family farm and the slave- 
labor cotton plantation. According to the 1860 census, in the South 65 
percent of its congressional districts were characterized economically 
by plantation agriculture, and in the North, 72 percent were predomi-
nantly rural, with only forty districts qualifying as industrial. Only in 
Rhode Island did workers in American factories amount to more than 
20 percent of the population (although Massachusetts was a close sec-
ond, at 19 percent); in the West, the numbers rarely topped 1 percent. 
Even then, fully half of American manufacturing in the 1860s was 
still powered by water rather than steam, and the number of workers 
one could expect to meet in a mill or factory hovered between eight 
and fourteen. Despite Jacob Riis’s sensational depiction of industrial 
workers living in near labor- camp conditions, the plat of working- class 
housing in the post- 1865 decades was the one- story and two- story 
cottage. Multifamily housing comprised only half the housing stock 
in Boston and Chicago; only 1 percent of the housing in Philadelphia 
accommodated six or more families. Not until the twentieth century 
would the United States begin to emerge as a genuinely industrial 
 10. Armistead L. Robinson, “Beyond the Realm of Social Consensus: New Meanings 
of Reconstruction for American History,” Journal of American History 68 (September 
1981), 279; Andrew Zimmerman, “Marxism, the Popular Front, and the American Civil 
War,” in The World the Civil War Made, edited by Gregory P. Downs and Kate Masur 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 308; Friedrich Engels to Karl 
Marx, November 15, 1862, in Robin Blackburn, An Unfinished Revolution: Karl Marx and 
Abraham Lincoln (New York: Verso, 2011), 201; Neil Davidson, “The American Civil 
War Considered as a Bourgeois Revolution,” Historical Materialism 19 (December 2011), 
45–91; Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 580.
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power and, with it, an economy clearly demarcated by class and class 
conflict. Even then, most Americans lived in towns of twenty- five 
hundred or less well into the twentieth century.11
 But a second and greater problem lies in the actual history of Recon-
struction as a conventional bourgeois revolution, because there is no 
evidence that the victorious Republicans who essayed to build a bour-
geois South in the ruins of the old plantation order ever panicked at 
the prospect of empowering blacks or poor whites, or betrayed them 
by establishing a self- protecting alliance with the quondam aristocrats. 
Nor did the freedpeople experience Marxist alienation; they endured 
bourgeois frustration at their exclusion from property ownership and 
political power, and that was how they articulated it. So we must say 
that Reconstruction was indeed a bourgeois revolution, but it was a 
pure one—a self- contained revolutionary event outside both Marx-
ist and counter- Marxist theory. It failed not because it sold out but 
because it was crushed by the resurgent political power of a bloodied 
but unbowed aristocracy.12
* * *
Reconstruction, when it has been the object of serious attention, has 
long been seen as a political event, a racial crisis moment, or a bizarre 
social and economic entr’acte between the Civil War and the Gilded 
Age. But it has only rarely been spoken of in ideological or intellectual 
terms; not even Foner’s massive Reconstruction gives the intellectual 
history of Reconstruction more than passing notice.13 But Reconstruc-
tion was the test of an ideology in ways that would overshadow all 
these other methodologies if we were not so inclined to embarrassment 
over the nature of that ideology. The great Republican goal of abolish-
ing slavery was not seen by Republicans, as we are tempted to see 
 11. James Huston, The British Gentry, the Southern Planter, and the Northern Family 
Farmer: Agriculture and Sectional Antagonism in North America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2015), 75, 22–31, and Calculating the Value of the Union: Slavery, 
Property Rights, and the Economic Origins of the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003), 75–76; David Montgomery, Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical 
Republicans, 1862–1872 (New York: Knopf, 1967), 4–5, 8; Robert J. Gordon, The Rise and 
Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2016), 97, 102–5.
 12. Neil Davidson, “The American Civil War Considered as a Bourgeois Revolution,” 
and John Ashworth, “Towards a Bourgeois Revolution? Explaining the American Civil 
War,” Historical Materialism 19 (January 2011), 45–91, 195–203.
 13. Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877 (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1988), 156. This stands in contrast to his virtuoso treatment of the 
ideology of prewar Republicanism, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the 
Republican Party before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
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it, as a crusade to right a racial injustice; abolishing slavery was not, 
to them, much of a racial question at all but rather an economic one. 
“I see National glory in the future such as the past has never seen,” 
rejoiced Benjamin Brown French, and not just because slavery “forever 
abolished” a racial caste system, but because the South would soon 
be “thriving under Free labor & Free rule! No more Cotton lords, but 
plenty of Cotton Commons, and all the land pouring out its productions 
& becoming immensely rich!” The Union “represents the principles of 
free labor,” declared William Cullen Bryant, and only when “the victory 
of the Northern society of free labor over the landed monopoly of the 
Southern aristocracy” was complete would the war be over.
The United States is truly the land—the very paradise of labor. . . . 
Even capital, which in Europe controls labor, here becomes subor-
dinate to and serves labor. It is the free and intelligent labor of the 
country that creates the Administration or the Government. . . . 
Whatever may be said against the doings and intrigues of the 
politicians, yet it is the highest honor of the system of government 
of the United States that Free labor—that is to say, the equal right 
of all men to the pursuit of happiness—has been recognized as 
the first natural and inalienable right.14
 It took a long time for the importance of the free- labor ideology 
to work its way back to the front of Civil War historiography, and in 
truth it still enjoys only the most tenuous of holds in that literature. 
In the most basic sense, free labor was simply shorthand for liberal 
economic democracy. It was the Enlightenment’s school of economics, 
and like the Enlightenment, it predicted that “democratic, bourgeois 
freedom and the supremacy of economics would one day lead to 
the salvation of all mankind.” Free labor found its ablest expositors 
in the “Manchester School” in Great Britain; Alexis de Tocqueville, 
François Guizot, and Edouard Laboulaye in France; Johan Jacoby 
and John Prince Smith in the German states; and the Whig party 
in the United States. Among free labor’s fundamental tenets were 
the encouragement of small- scale manufacturing, especially through 
government- sponsored “internal improvements” in the form of canals, 
highways, and railroads; economic mobility, with constant movement 
 14. “Diary entry for July 8, 1863,” in Benjamin Brown French, Witness to the Young 
Republic: A Yankee’s Journal, 1828–1870, edited by Donald B. Cole and John Joseph 
McDonough (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1989), 426; The Preser-
vation of the Union, a National Economic Necessity (New York: W. C. Bryant, 1863), 5–6; 
W. W. Broom, Great and Grave Question for American Politicians, with a Topic for America’s 
Statesmen (New York: C. S. Westcott, 1865), 65.
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up the ladder of classes; and the practice of a constellation of bour-
geois virtues—thrift, prudence, industry, religious faith, temperance, 
rationality, nationalism—that together would dignify “the enterpris-
ing mechanic, who raises himself by his ingenious labors from the 
dust and turmoil of his workshop, to an abode of ease and elegance” 
and “the industrious tradesman, whose patient frugality enables him 
at last to accumulate enough to forego the duties of the counter and 
indulge a well- earned leisure.”15
 In the eyes of the free- labor bourgeoisie, the mistake of the South 
had been to allow the thousand- bale planters to turn the Enlighten-
ment clock backward to medieval serfdom, in much the same way the 
Congress of Vienna had turned back the political clock to the ancien 
régime. “Who knows,” asked the New- York Tribune, “but we may see 
revived [in the South] the feudal tenures—maiden- right, wardship, 
baronial robberies, the seizure of white children for the market, mili-
tary service, and the horrible hardships of villenage which men have 
fondly deemed forever abolished” as the logical corollaries of slavery. 
In the South, the ruling class of “monarchists and aristocrats” had 
shunned government- sponsored improvements, cultivated a cultural 
style based on braggadocio, and held poor white citizens and black 
slaves in the grip of a permanent and oppressive hierarchy. “There 
labor has been degraded, the laborer left untaught . . . thus convert-
ing half the Union into a charnel house of despotism, without a free 
religion, free speech, free press or free schools.”16
 The Civil War, however, had swept this “despotism” away, and 
then cleared the path for the introduction into the South of a New 
England–style “high type” of culture: “the cultivated valley, the peace-
ful village, the church, the school- house, and thronging cities.” James 
 15. György Lukács, “The Changing Function of Historical Materialism,” in History 
and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, translated by Rodney Livingstone 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), 225; Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, 11–39; 
Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979), 152–78; Michael S. Green, Freedom, Union, and Power: Lincoln and 
His Party during the Civil War (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 30–57; “The 
Labor Crisis,” North American Review 105 (July 1867), 178, 181, 183, 185, 197; Gruner, 
“The Revolution of July 1830 and the Expression ‘Bourgeoisie,’” 462.
 16. “The Slave- Holding Utopia,” New- York Daily Tribune, October 6, 1862; “Our 
Country’s Future,” Chicago Tribune, September 28, 1864; Proofs for Workingman of the 
Monarchic and Aristocratic Designs of the Southern Conspirators and their Northern Allies 
(n.p., 1864), 1; Peter Kolchin, American Slavery, 1619–1877 (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1993), 179; Heather Cox Richardson, The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics 
in the Post- Civil War North, 1865–1901 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 6–8, 22–26.
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Lawrence Orr, South Carolina’s first Reconstruction governor, sighed 
to Northern journalist Sidney Andrews that he was “tired of South 
Carolina as she was. . . . I covet for her the material prosperity of New 
England. I would have her acres teem with life and vigor and industry 
and intelligence, as do those of Massachusetts.” The South “under the 
old system” was “adverse to manufacturing and commercial enter-
prises,” but now, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine predicted, the “tide 
of free labor” that would rush into the conquered Confederacy “will 
be incalculable.” They meant that literally: “the only certain road to 
Union- izing the South is, to plant in it colonies of Northern men” to 
displace the plantation owners. Then, at last, “under the mighty spur 
of equal competition that so quickens every impulse and faculty, and 
brings all the energies into play,” the South’s “worn- out plantations 
will become thriving farms, its mines and inexhaustible water- powers 
will call into play the incessant demand and supply of vigorous indus-
try and active capital.17
 Frederick Douglass envisioned a “reconstruction such as will protect 
loyal men, black and white, in their persons,” but one which will also 
“cause Northern industry, Northern capital, and Northern civilization 
to flow into the South, and make a man from New England as much 
at home in Carolina as elsewhere in the Republic.” In John Greenleaf 
Whittier’s vision, Reconstruction would
The cruel lie of caste refute,
Old forms remould, and substitute
For Slavery’s lash the freeman’s will,
For blind routine, wise- handed skill;
A school- house plant on every hill,
Stretching in radiate nerve- lines thence
The quick wires of intelligence;
Till North and South together brought
Shall own the same electric thought,
In peace a common flag salute,
And, side by side in labor’s free
And unresentful rivalry,
Harvest the fields wherein they fought.
 17. “The Work to Be Done at the South,” American Freedman 1 (December 1866), 136; 
Sidney Andrews, The South since the War: As Shown by Fourteen Weeks of Travel and Obser-
vation in Georgia and the Carolinas (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1866), 96; “Desperation 
and Colonization,” Continental Monthly 1 (June 1862), 664–65; Samuel Osgood, “New 
Aspects of the American Mind,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 34 (May 1867), 795; “The 
Southern Industrial Prospect,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 52 (March 1876), 590.
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 The success of Reconstruction, argued Carl Schurz, could be mea-
sured accurately only when the South “shall have thus fulfilled social 
and political organization all those conditions which form the basis 
of free- labor society.”18
 Albert T. Morgan, who had been a student at Oberlin College at the 
war’s beginning and served in the 2nd Wisconsin at Gettysburg, had a 
vision of Reconstruction as “a tide of thrifty emigrants and others with 
capital settling southward” and “within twenty- five years” making 
“the two million people of the Mississippi lowlands twenty millions, 
and in a century a hundred millions.” Charles Woodward Stearns, who 
had followed John Brown to Kansas, resolved “during the war . . . that 
if it resulted in the abolition of Slavery,” he would “go South, and do 
what we could, for the perfect development of the colored race. . . . 
First, their education and moral improvement; secondly, their right 
to vote; and thirdly, the making them the owners of the land they 
cultivate.” Reconstruction offered a means of refashioning the entire 
labor system of the South, provided, wrote Albion Tourgée, that the 
South was “desouthernized and thoroughly nationalized.”19
 Tourgée was an example of how eager Northerners were to help 
this process along. Born in Ohio and educated in New York, Tourgée 
had served in the 105th Ohio, endured the sufferings of Libby Prison 
as a prisoner of war, and settled in Greensboro, North Carolina, at the 
end of the war to find relief in a warmer climate for a wound that had 
damaged his spine. He opened a law office and became president of a 
small wood- handle business, the Snow Turning Company, whose suc-
cess left him “perfectly thunderstruck at the profits” as well as the good 
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wages paid to its largely black workforce. John Hay, who had been 
Lincoln’s private secretary, was another example. He had been sent in 
1864 to register Southerners willing to take the oath of allegiance, and 
came away sufficiently intrigued by Florida (“It is the only thing that 
smells of the Original Eden on the Continent”) that he bought land 
to grow oranges near St. Augustine. Even Harriet Beecher Stowe, the 
author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, bought orange groves near Jacksonville, 
moved South, and created a free- labor colony around the village of 
Mandarin. “People came hither from the North,” wrote a New Orleans 
contributor to DeBow’s Review, “with the idea that they were coming 
to an El Dorado, where fortunes were to be gained in a day.”20
 Here was a bourgeois revolution—not, in the Marxist sense, a 
necessary footstool to the “real” proletarian revolution or the self- 
interested embrace of Southern grandees by terrified Northern bour-
geoisie to keep black people and white working people at bay, but a 
pure bourgeois revolution, as an end in itself, as the triumph of liberal 
democracy, an Enlightenment counterrevolution against what the 
Northern middle classes feared might be the real wave of the future, 
the Romantic renascence of oligarchy and monarchy.
* * *
The principal obstacle to realizing this dream was the refusal of the 
defeated Southern planter class to admit that it had been defeated, 
for that class had by no means been swept away by the war. “They 
are beaten, they are cowed,” warned Union quartermaster general 
Montgomery Meigs, but “they have been treated with trust[in]g con-
descension instead of the severity that justice & policy both demanded 
& they will revenge themselves for their defeat upon the North & 
upon every black in every mode which may be safe.” Slavery might 
be gone, but “the masters, whose pride and honor are staked upon 
the claim that free labor must fail, combine to make it fail.”21 They, 
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too, had lived by a set of presuppositions, but one based on a gen-
eral suspicion of bourgeois ambitions. Slave-owning promoted “a 
certain carelessness of wealth and easy profuseness in expenditure,” 
complained Robert Dale Owen. “Habits of regulated industry are 
seldom found within the sphere of its influence,—its tendency being 
to substitute . . . indolent fashions of dependence and of luxurious 
self- indulgence.” The “typical Southerner,” feared a contributor to the 
Atlantic Monthly, “possessed a . . . cast of character which was founded 
mainly on family, distinction, social culture, exemption from toil, and 
command over the lives and fortunes of his underlings.”
Careless of his own money, he was inclined to be careless in all 
pecuniary affairs, often running heavily into debt and showing 
habitual negligence in settling small accounts. . . . A reputation for 
gallantry and generosity became highly esteemed in the South. In 
consequence, many individuals in their efforts to attain it degen-
erated into bravoes and spendthrifts; the character of the fire- eater 
became almost as much admired as that of the gentleman. The 
passing of high words and blows, canings, cowhidings, and so 
on, all terminated by the drawing of knives and pistols . . . and 
duels, became every- day occurrences in the South.
“As long as slave labor existed,” one South Carolinian admitted, “the 
habits and predilections of the whites were unfavorable to commerce 
and manufactures,” and “free labor avoided the limits of the South.”22
 Not only the culture of the South but its physical circumstances as 
well stood in the path of embourgeoisement. The South owned only 12 
percent of the nation’s mills and factories, and employed as labor-
ers in those establishments only 7 percent of its population. Cotton 
agriculture remained after 1865, as it had been before the war, the 
producer of the republic’s single most valuable export commodity 
(some 32 percent of all exports as late as 1889). And no wonder: while 
commodity prices for wheat, corn, and coal had operated (except for 
the war years) within fairly narrow ranges, cotton was selling above 
all its prewar highs; in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas, 
cotton acreage and production expanded, employing a black labor 
force indistinguishable from that under slavery. Great Britain still 
bought 58 percent of the cotton it imported for textile manufacturing 
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from the United States, and the percentage would continue to rise 
through 1876.23
 Struggling to jump- start a New England–ized economy, émigré 
Northern bourgeois missionaries like Tourgée and Stearns borrowed 
a page from the old Whig strategy book and spent unprecedented 
amounts of money on what the Whig Party had once called “internal 
improvements”—especially railroads and public education. Railroads 
would bring markets into the cotton hinterlands, dazzling the poor 
white farmer with goods, freeing the black farmer from debt and ten-
ancy, and opening access to markets for cash crops. They will “inspire 
the enterprise of the South with new vigor” and encourage “every 
sensible man” to “bend himself to the task of building up the new 
South instead of brooding over the glories of the lost cause.” And 
education would ensure that “the child of the humblest citizen may, 
without expense, be carefully instructed in all common branches.” 
So Alabama and Texas doubled their railroad mileage between 1866 
and 1872; Arkansas, which counted only thirty- eight miles of railroad 
at the end of the war, had 258 by 1872. Elementary and secondary 
schools more than doubled in Mississippi, North and South Carolina, 
and Florida between 1870 and 1879; in Georgia they quadrupled.24
 But the railroads were not, as it turned out, a charm. Construc-
tion costs fluctuated between $30,000 and $50,000 per mile, and new 
rail lines built on speculation folded as fast as they were finished. 
“The great majority of railroads,” William Grosvenor reported in 
1873, “yield less than ordinary interest on the investment, and very 
many . . . still barely pay running expenses and interest on bonds.” 
In the Natchez district, six new railroad companies were established 
in the early 1870s; all of them failed. Georgia’s state- owned railroad, 
the Western and Atlantic, plunged the state into a debt of $750,000 in 
two years. Similar problems dogged the effort to jump- start education. 
In Southern states where no public schooling systems had existed 
before the war, the construction and staffing costs were staggering. 
In Mississippi alone, 432 schoolhouses were built in just the 1871–72 
fiscal year; the teaching staffs alone numbered forty- eight hundred, 
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and the overall costs during the Mississippi system was just over a 
million dollars. These investments left Southern states mired in debt, 
Louisiana alone having $2.2 million in unfunded liability, tax receipts 
of only $4.3 million, and a budget deficit of $60,000. South Carolina 
was in even worse shape: it had $5.3 million in unfunded indebted-
ness and only $1.6 million in revenue.25
 Despite the overall impoverishment imposed on the South by the war 
and the legal abolition of slavery, the patterns of economic production 
remained remarkably unchanged. In western Alabama’s “black belt,” 
236 landowners possessed at least $10,000 in real estate in 1860 (with 
the median landholding amounting to sixteen hundred acres); 101 of 
those landowners were still in possession in 1870—which was about 
the same rate of persistence over time that had prevailed before the war. 
If anything, the patterns of landowning showed increases in the size of 
landholdings by the top 8 percent of planters in 1870, while the middle 
brackets actually showed a decline. In North Carolina’s Union County, 
agricultural acreage not only increased in the post- Reconstruction years, 
but so did the number of cotton plantations of over one thousand acres; 
in Mississippi’s Claiborne County, the number of landholdings in the 
50- to- 199- acre bracket jumped from 73 to 170. And it was noticeable 
that outside the principal cities, that great marker of bourgeois eco-
nomics, the use of cash as a medium of exchange, entered only fitfully 
into Southern calculations. The New York Cash Store in Greenville, 
Alabama, advertised (despite its name) that “we will take in exchange 
for goods, country produce, particularly Eggs, Chickens, Bees Wax, Dry 
Hides, Peas, Corn Meal, and anything else that we can dispose of.”26
 Former slaveholders, thanks in large measure to the Johnson 
amnesties and the failure to break up Confederate property owning 
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or confiscate the land, were thus free to use cotton profits to maintain 
a version of the plantation system, closing off opportunities for the 
freedmen to acquire land and forcing them into peonage. “Slavery is 
abolished,” agreed William Grosvenor, “but peonage, or some other 
form of forced labor, hardly less unjust or dangerous to the nation than 
slavery itself, is the natural result of the present condition of affairs 
at the South, the only solution to which the mind or inclination of 
the land- owner turns.” Peonage, in turn, gave white Democrats the 
power to control black voting; and control of voting would spell both 
the end of Republican governments and a determination to keep free- 
labor economics at arm’s length and “keep the negro in his condition 
of ignorance, that they may retain him as nearly as possible in his old 
state of slavery.”27 “The relation of master and slave no longer exists 
here,” wrote one Mississippi valley planter, “but out of it has evolved 
that of patron and retainer,” which was a far cry from “one purely 
of business” or “the ordinary relation of landlord and tenant or of 
employer and employee.” Given the resilience of cotton as a com-
modity, free labor had to be suppressed to prevent labor shortages that 
would have driven the cost of production beyond control. Reconstruc-
tion Republicans might have found a way to undermine the re- creation 
of planter dominance if they could have recruited small- scale white 
farmers to their banner. But the taxes required to support the new 
investments were based on property, and they pressed down heavily 
on no one so much as the small farmer. “Here and there through all 
the cotton states . . . are reappearing the planter princes of old time, 
still lords of acres though not of slaves.”28 Slavery might have been 
legally dead, but it was only being replaced by hutted serfdom.
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 Northern free- labor apostles, discouraged by the poor inroads they 
had made on Southern culture, went home, disillusioned. They were 
only “merchants, shopkeepers, mechanics, manufacturers, specula-
tors, brokers, bankers” and not “barons after the fashion of the South.” 
They were subject to harassment, shunning, and violence. Leander 
Bigger, an Ohioan who moved to South Carolina as a Freedmen’s 
Bureau agent after service in the Union army, described the burning 
of a store he owned west of Manning, South Carolina, where the chief 
offense seemed to have been his willingness to extend credit to black 
farmers trying to set up on their own.
They ransacked the store. . . . All my dry goods—everything that 
was combustible—they took out into the square, and took a keg 
of powder that I kept in a concealed place . . . piled the goods 
over it, and set the pile on fire. The goods, being calicoes, muslins, 
and delains, burnt slowly. They carried us up to the fire, and the 
speaker (they gave all their orders by signals) ordered his men 
to mount. They mounted their horses, formed in line, and then 
the speaker came up to me and told me, “You must quit busi-
ness. This is only a warning: the next time we will put you on the 
fire.” . . . He said he was from hell and represented the devil; that 
he would take me with him if I did not obey orders.29
 Another South Carolina “merchant” committed a similar trespass 
by trying to impose the logic of the ledger by foreclosing “a lien he 
had on the crop of a planter’s widow in the county.”
He did it because she was pursuing the usual aristocratic course 
of evading payment and putting him off. The indignity threw the 
lady into convulsions which caused her death. She was hardly 
buried before her three grown sons, all under twenty- five, were 
mounted and on their way to the merchant’s. They found him 
in a lawyer’s office in town, put everybody out but him, and 
closed the door. His screams and cries for mercy alarmed all the 
village. A crowd collected, and tried to interfere. But one of the 
young men came out on the steps with a cocked pistol in each 
hand, and kept them off till the victim was insensible, beaten to a 
jelly, gashed all over, and had one ear cut off. They then came out 
and rode off. The merchant lay at the point of death for weeks, 
is yet (two months since the fray) in bed, and is maimed for life. 
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The affair was mentioned in no paper, and the young men have 
never been indicted.
 Harriet Beecher Stowe’s free- labor colony in Florida limped on 
through white suspicion and unexplained arson, and Stowe’s pres-
ence gradually diminished until by 1884 she and her ailing husband 
left to return no more. Charles Stearns was similarly flummoxed at 
the unwillingness of black Southerners to internalize the free- labor 
work ethic. “I can describe their conduct no better than by calling it 
a perfect carnival of waste. . . . If hay of their own needed cutting, it 
would be left standing until nearly dried up; and if we found fault 
with all this dilatoriness, we would be denounced as ‘worse than the 
rebels.’” Eventually, Stearns concluded that he “cannot conscientiously 
advise Northern men to come South.”30
 The great losers in this process were Southern blacks. In the Mis-
sissippi Valley and the vast Black Belt of Alabama, Georgia, and the 
Carolinas, only 8 percent of black people owned their own land. In 
South Carolina, over 75 percent of the lower Piedmont’s twenty- four 
thousand tenant farmers were black, fully half of them sharecroppers 
by 1900.31 “Although emancipated,” John Mercer Langston warned 
in 1879, the freedman “has not been given practical independence 
of the old slave- holding class, constituting the land- proprietors and 
employers in the section where he lives and labors for daily support.” 
And no wonder: Southern elites saw little they wanted to embrace 
in the free- labor ideology, nor were there many incentives for them 
to do so. “Southerners used to look on the Northerners as coarse, 
money- getting people. . . . Their contempt for the commercial character 
of the North originated, of course, in the aristocratic training of the 
plantations, and their hatred of the liberty and equality doctrines . . . 
arose from the intolerance natural to all aristocracies.” But so did 
Southern yeomen, who could not disentangle white supremacy from 
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economics. The same Confederate private who denounced the crimes 
of Reconstruction at the beginning of this essay likewise hailed slavery 
as the best charm against the evil attractions of the marketplace:
What if the future shall say, that what the world called slavery, 
railed against as such, rolling up the whites of quite worldly eyes, 
in horror that such a thing should exist, stands forth as a patriar-
chal, beneficent relation, the kindest for the slave, as he came to 
us, not as France’s “rights of man” fain would have him come; 
and what is now lauded to the skies, as “freedom,” be exhibited, 
as a cruel, grasping sauve qui peut, and Devil take the hindmost, 
the most sordid, the most heartless of all tyranny, the one which 
most degradingly, and least pitifully, shoves the weakest to the 
wall, and keeps him there.
Free labor could even inspire a peculiarly gendered disdain, since 
(declared the Southern novelist Augusta Jane Evans in 1867) free labor 
made Northerners “effeminate, selfish, most unscrupulously grasp-
ing.” Even their children were “pitiable manikins already chanting 
praises to the Gold Calf.”32
 Redemption was an anti- free- labor strategy as much as it was a 
strategy of political exclusion. “The nigger is going to be made a serf, 
sure as you live,” prophesied one white Alabamian to John Townsend 
Trowbridge in 1865. “It won’t need any law for that.” And not only 
blacks. When it was pointed out that South Carolina’s “eight box law” 
(requiring a voter to be able to read the names of candidates and the 
respective offices they were running for in order to place the correct 
ballot in one of eight ballot boxes) would disfranchise poor whites 
as easily as blacks, the major general of the South Carolina militia 
merely replied, “We care not if it does.” The leader of the Republican 
minority protested that this had no other purpose than “keeping the 
middle classes and the poor whites, together with the negroes, from 
having anything to do with the elections,” and he was not wrong.33
* * *
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Reconstruction aspired to be a pure bourgeois revolution, and it 
expected to triumph as effortlessly as nineteenth- century liberal 
notions of progress had promised. If Marx had been right, that tri-
umph would have, in turn, yielded ineluctably to a workers’ rebel-
lion, but it did not. So much for ineluctability; time sometimes does 
indeed go backward. To have achieved a different outcome would 
have required two ingredients—time and force—which circumstances 
denied Reconstruction. It is not inconsistent to imagine a bourgeois 
revolution arriving in the company of swords (that was certainly 
the way the English Civil Wars were described for a long time), and 
Wendell Phillips certainly believed that Reconstruction could hardly 
last less than forty years. “We have to . . . annihilate the old South, 
and put a new one there,” and the best plan Phillips could imagine 
was long- term military occupation. “When England conquered the 
Highlands, she held them,—held them until she could educate them; 
and it took a generation. That is just what we have to do with the 
South.”34 But as Gregory P. Downs, in one of the more remarkable 
books on Reconstruction in the past twenty years, has complained, 
few Americans were prepared to supply those swords in meaningful 
numbers or over a meaningful length of time. “Out of the reduced 
army of thirty thousand men,” estimated the North American Review 
on the eve of Grant’s reelection in 1872, “the government could spare 
only one tenth for service at the South, exclusive of ordinary garrison 
duty.” The reluctance to use state force in overwhelming strength, and 
to bear the political costs that accompany it, are easy to criticize from 
the distance of a century and a half, but the criticisms tend to freeze 
on the lips when it is realized that these were exactly the criticisms 
deployed most recently against the Gulf Wars.35
 In the South, the pure bourgeois revolution failed. Its white pro-
moters were politically inexperienced, and they made gaffes from 
which it proved impossible to recover. Their chief ally, the freedpeo-
ple, were a numerical minority almost everywhere in Southern poli-
tics, and their own inexperience and a lifelong suspicion bred from 
oppression and betrayal made it difficult to create stable coalitions. 
The freedpeople were frankly reluctant to accept white Republican 
leadership as unquestioningly as whites expected. The “Gideonites” 
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who descended on the occupied Port Royal Sound to “educate and 
uplift” the freedpeople discovered that “nothing is more evident to 
those who actually know the Colored, than that while they respect, 
value, and revere, the good, they want little companionship with the 
whites.” Black Methodist leader Henry McNeal Turner frankly told 
“my colored friends” that “the white men are not to be trusted. They 
will betray you.”36
 But just as divisive were the fault lines that separated blacks from 
blacks. A racial hierarchy had long existed within the black South 
that bestowed privilege along a carefully graded spectrum of color. 
“There is in the Southern States a great amount of prejudice in regards 
to color,” William Wells Brown admitted in 1867, “even among the 
negroes themselves. The nearer the negro or mulatto approaches to the 
white, the more he seems to feel his superiority over those of a darker 
hue.” In postwar Savannah, Aaron Bradley mounted a political smear 
campaign against his rival for a seat in Congress, Richard White, a 
mixed- race Union Army veteran from Ohio. White, sneered Bradley, 
was a “hybrid” who did not deserve true African American votes. 
“What color will he represent himself?” asked Bradley. Answer: “The 
greasy color.” Even Frederick Douglass struck sparks with Martin 
Delany and John Mercer Langston, with Douglass (himself biracial) 
bitterly criticizing Delany’s black racial purism for “going about the 
same length in favor of blacks, as the whites have done in favor of 
the doctrine of white superiority.” Delany was right to assert African 
Americans’ “need for dignity and self- respect,” but not to point where 
“he stands up so straight that he leans back a little.”37
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 These interracial feuds lay at the base of the most singular absence 
in black Reconstruction in the South, and that was the nonemergence 
of a single commanding leader in the style of Martin Luther King 
Jr. who could bind together the disparate shards of African Ameri-
can identity into a single movement. Since only Louisiana and South 
Carolina had developed prewar black populations who were prop-
erty owners, business proprietors, and skilled craftsmen, the likeliest 
quarter from which such leadership could have developed was the 
Northern black community. But few black people in the North made 
the attempt. And no wonder. It was doubtful whether Southern blacks 
would feel obliged to follow Northern leadership, and in 1879, the 
National Conference of Colored Men actually witnessed an attack on 
“Fred. Douglass and his accomplices” as “well- to- do Northern men 
who will not travel out of their way to benefit the suffering Southern 
Negro, and who care not for the interests of their race.” Moreover, 
Southern whites would certainly make aggressive Northern blacks a 
target of choice. “Write as you please, but never go south, or killed you 
most assuredly will be,” warned Julia Griffiths Crofts, Douglass’s British 
friend and supporter. “You are, in many respects, a marked man.” Only 
Martin Delany played a significant role in Reconstruction politics in 
the South, although it was usually more divisive than helpful and 
ended when he accepted a judicial appointment from Democrats. 
“What benefit,” he asked in 1874, “have the colored people in South 
Carolina derived from the propagation of Republican sentiments?” 
None, in his estimate. “Such a party is not worth the effort to keep it 
in existence.”38
 But the final expiration of Reconstruction was an act of homicide, 
not a natural—albeit premature—death. Instead, the same Roman-
tic feudalism that had created the old Southern order reasserted its 
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hegemony, and in another decade, the promoters of a “New South” 
would link hands with Northern Democrats in a comprehensive cri-
tique of the free- labor ideology. The bourgeoisie in this bourgeois 
revolution scenario did not flee to the aristocrats to create a “coun-
terrevolution of property”; quite the opposite occurred. The postwar 
Southern aristocrats ensured the destruction of the pure bourgeois 
revolution by appealing to a set of cultural and racial biases that safely 
defused the importance of property and sharply restricted access to 
it.
 Understanding Reconstruction as a pure bourgeois revolution that 
was strangled in its cradle by vengeful cotton nabobs offers a fourth 
understanding of Reconstruction. On the one hand, it rebukes those 
Eurocentric Marxists who seem unwilling or unable to see capitalism 
or the bourgeoisie as anything but a poor transition to a collectivist 
future; indeed, a “bourgeois revolution” ought to excite an element 
of sympathy for those who so energetically fought with the beasts at 
Ephesus during Reconstruction’s dying years. It should also point 
us toward a more comprehensive notion of what constitutes Recon-
struction, since consideration of the activities of the South’s Northern 
Democratic allies has been almost nonexistent. Yet the opposition of 
the Northern Democracy was as crucial an element in the failure of 
Reconstruction as the Ku Klux Klan or the Redeemers. “It has always 
been a sad and sore fact for an honest lover of his country to contem-
plate,” sighed John Pendleton Kennedy, that “the South played off 
that great party of the North, to make it subservient to the selfish and 
sectional purpose of putting the whole Union at the foot” of “the lordly 
ambition of the aristocratic South. . . . Nothing is stranger than that 
long association of the aristocratic with the democratic element of the 
country . . . pigging it together in the same truckle- bed.”39 Nothing 
stranger, perhaps; but that alliance survived the Civil War, and the 
reassertion of a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives 
in 1875 was as much the curtain- downer for Reconstruction as the 
inauguration of Hayes a year and a half later.
 Reconstruction’s failure also serves as a warning to overexuber-
ant neoliberals not to embrace historical inevitability for themselves, 
either. After the destruction of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama 
seized on the ignominious collapse of the Soviet system as proof 
that “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” was “the 
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universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human government.” That conclusion was, to say the least, premature, 
and not only because it reckoned without the rise of Islamist theocracy 
or the fallout from the 2008 worldwide recession, which provoked a 
renascence of Marxist advocacy in the writings of Antonio Negri and 
Michael Hardt, Alain Badiou, the Occupy Movement, and Thomas 
Picketty. As Badiou remarked, “[T]he senescent collapse of the USSR” 
only “provisionally suspended fear” on the part of the bourgeoisie. 
“Monetarist free exchange and its mediocre political appendage, 
capitalist- parliamentarianism . . . is ever more poorly dissimulated 
behind the fine word ‘democracy.’”40 This pattern is itself an echo of 
what happened in Reconstruction, where Southerners stood the free 
labor ideology on its head, turning it from being an engine of social 
mobility into a legal chimera for the enforcement of serflike “contracts” 
with laborers, and it stands as a warning to those who yet believe that 
liberal democracy is the most desirable political future to be as wary 
of Whiggish assumptions about liberal democracy’s inevitability as 
the Marxists were about the dialectic. Human society has oscillated 
between desires for stability, security, and reciprocity—which is what 
feudalism, Marxism, and theocracy promise—and desires for mobility, 
liberty, and profit, which is what the Enlightenment offered to satisfy 
on a world- historical scale. Hence there is nothing that can be declared 
permanent in a “bourgeois revolution,” and our own Reconstruction, 
not to mention a good deal of recent history, is the unhappy proof.
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